China has been quietly expanding its already considerable influence across resource-rich Africa, particularly as Europe’s presence diminishes and the United States’ engagement becomes uncertain in the region. The latest example is the ongoing visit of China’s top diplomat, Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi, to Africa. Officially, this visit to Namibia, Nigeria, Chad, and the Republic of the Congo has been described by China as an annual diplomatic routine.
While global experts eagerly await the outcomes of Wang Yi’s visit, many African leaders are concerned about China’s growing influence and its potential implications. Key concerns include China’s attempts to exert absolute control over African economies, restrict market access, unbalance trade relationships, and limit opportunities for value addition within the continent.
China’s Africa policy forms part of a broader global strategy aimed at fostering dependencies and interdependencies. These dynamics are designed to make nations and regions more likely to align with Beijing’s ambitions on the global stage. Africa’s 50-plus votes in the United Nations, for instance, provide a significant opportunity for China to influence multilateral institutions and reshape global norms—particularly on contentious issues such as human rights.
China’s sustained engagement in Africa has yielded strategic advantages. Notably, it has successfully reduced recognition of Taiwan’s government among African nations. Countries such as Burkina Faso, Malawi, Liberia, and Senegal have switched allegiance from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China, leaving Eswatini as the sole African nation to maintain ties with Taiwan. Historically, African votes were instrumental in 1971 when the PRC gained control of China’s seat in the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, displacing representatives of the Chinese nationalist forces governing Taiwan.
Critics argue that China’s engagement in Africa has often been exploitative, with the continent serving as a platform for global and military expansion, market dominance, and resource extraction. Nonetheless, Beijing continues to employ a variety of means—diplomatic, political and economic—to achieve its objectives in Africa.
China’s Military interests in Africa:
China has been constantly expanding military-training roster in Africa. The PLA Navy’s 47th Escort Task Group (ETG) is set to arrive in the Gulf of Aden, off the Somali coast in early 2025.
China is set to launch a program to train 6,000 African senior officers and 500 junior officers and 1,000 law enforcement officers by 2027—a slight increase in the numbers it trained prior to the COVID pandemic. China’s military education has been designed to cultivate personal, professional, and political ties as well as promote China’s governance models, including party control of the military. Roughly one-third of China’s 37 professional military education institutions admit foreign students. Sometimes close to half of the students attending these schools are of African origin.
China’s ties with governments and political parties:
China has always focussed its attention on political parties and government ties in Africa. The CCP’s International Department (CCP-ID) maintains ties with 130 African political and opposition parties, with different CCP party schools taking turns to train them. The aim of 2025-2027 Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Plan is to train 1,000 African party officials and organize regular exchanges for parliaments and local governments. Since the FOCAC Summit in last September, the CCP-ID held exchanges with senior party and government leaders from various African countries like Algeria, the Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Africa, Togo, Tunisia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. African officials have attended 15 seminars at the Academy for International Business Officials (AIBO) within the Ministry of Commerce, China’s flagship institute for training foreign officials.
The spread of CCP-funded African party and government schools and training programs is a development to watch in 2025. Pro-democracy movements view them as a danger to Africa’s democratization and are highly critical of China’s extensive party-building programs because CCP’s methods are of absolute control over Africa.
Beijing Action Plan (2025-2027)
China has made a two year action plan to expand its global influence through FOCAC. The latest FOCAC Plan outlines 10 programs, from industrialization and expansion of Chinese free trade zones to police and military cooperation. Last September, the FOCAC meetings were followed by senior Chinese official visits to Kenya, Malawi, Seychelles, Tanzania, South Africa, and Zambia. In November, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping visited Morocco to gather support for FOCAC’s new program.
The FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2025-2027) recommits China and African countries to coordinate their positions in multilateral institutions. The Plan would continue mobilizing African participation in the alternative global institutional architecture that China has created over the past 20 years. African diplomatic support would likewise continue to be leveraged to support China at the United Nations (UN) and other multilateral bodies. The Plan also prioritizes implementing the Global Security Initiative (GSI), Global Development Initiative (GDI), and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI)—a trifecta of concepts underlying China’s effort to advance alternative global norms and practices.
African countries generally strive to maintain cordial ties with China, recognizing the potential benefits these relations can bring. However, China’s initiatives are often viewed as efforts to secure African support for its broader agenda of reshaping global norms. It is time for African leaders to recognize their own geopolitical importance and prioritize their own interests, rather than playing into China’s hands and enabling its global ambitions.
